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decide that Park's case should be dismissed under an 
interest of justice statute, there would be no determination 
on its merits. As a semi-voluntary defendant, such a 
dismissal would constitute his one bite of the apple.
If Parks ceased his treatment regimen and/or committed 
another crime (depending on whatever agreement was 
made as a condition for his dismissal) the court could 
grant the prosecution's application to resubmit Park's 
original indictment to a grand jury. This procedure 
contrasts sharply with the complete acquittal Parks would 
normally receive if he were found to have acted 
unconsciously (the actual outcome of Parks), or, at the 
other extreme, his potential candidacy for life 
imprisonment. In the United States, Parks would be 
eligible for the death penalty if he were found to have 
acted consciously and in a premeditated manner.
CONCLUSION
There are all sorts of line-drawing dilemmas throughouto o
the criminal law. However, my research indicates that the 
problems with the voluntary act requirement are 
particularly acute:
(1) The requirement is the initial filter (at least 
conceptually) for all individuals potentially eligible for 
the criminal justice system. It therefore assesses 
actors with the widest possible range of mental states, 
behaviours and potential defences, because the system 
has yet to determine if they should proceed or be 
acquitted entirely. A forced "voluntary/involuntary" 
dichotomy amidst such heterogeneity can produce 
particularly artificial choices with potentially extreme 
variations in sanctions for similar types of behaviours 
depending on how they are categorised (e.g. 
involuntary, insane, voluntary and dangerous).
(2) Other criminal law doctrines (such as culpability) have 
a relatively broader line-drawing selection (for 
example, the four mental states under the Model Penal 
Code) within a more homogenous group of individuals 
(persons who have already been determined to commit
only voluntary acts). Therefore, the line-drawing 
choices and their consequences are far less extreme 
than those faced by voluntariness determinations.
(3) Voluntariness determinations rely relatively more on 
factual medical/psychological information than do other 
dichotomous conceptions (such as reasonableness 
versus unreasonableness), which depend on jurors' 
views of appropriate social and moral norms of 
behaviour. The criminal justice system presumes that 
jurors know what kind of behaviour is unreasonable 
based on their own kinds of life experiences. Insanity 
determinations also have a strong normative 
component, even though expert testimony and legal 
standards provide guidance. Yet, involuntariness 
doctrines or jury instructions commonly offer specific 
examples of what that term means (for example, 
unconsciousness due to sleepwalking) because jurors 
typically are not going to know otherwise (insanity 
provisions do not contain such specific examples). In 
this sense, the science of involuntariness (and 
unconsciousness) is particularly critical.
My research concludes that the criminal law, as it 
currently exists, is sufficiently robust to incorporate new 
research on consciousness without being dismantled 
philosophically. Consciousness research does not threaten 
the criminal law's free will foundation any more than 
traditionally accepted science and doctrines. Rather, the 
research enlightens our normatively held beliefs and 
values. Potential claims to the contrary predict, 
prematurely, a type of deterministic society and individual 
that may exist only in novels. Time will tell, but that time 
has not yet arrived. ©
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This monograph is an interesting piece of the puzzle depicting the relationship between the individual and the state (national and European). The authors 
have drawn relevance from different disciplines (law, 
political science, international relations) and constructed 
some basic assumptions to support their thesis. Stefanou 
and Xanthaki's pivotal point is a detailed analysis and a
splendid case-law codification of the non-contractual 
liability regime ante and post Francovich, which builds their 
argument that Article 215(2) EC could be utilised as the 
procedural basis for joint liability of EU institutions and 
member states (and their authorities) for failure to 
implement Community law.
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The authors recognise the limited role individuals, as 
subjects of Community law, play in the European 
integration process, in its legal and political dimensions. A 
thorough and informative summary of integration theories 
in Chapter 2 leads the reader to the conclusion that the 
European integration process is predominately a state 
affair (from the traditional public international law 
perspective), although the individual is explicitly a subject 
of the new legal order alongside member states.
The authors question the dynamics which underpin 
access to justice for individuals within the remit of 
centralised Community law enforcement in Chapters 3 
and 4. An excellent critique of cases relating to action for 
damages under 2 15(2) EC before the ECJ and the judicial 
developments post Francovich shows the painfully difficult 
route individuals have to take (both in admissibility and 
substantive terms) in order to seek compensation for 
damages caused by wrongful acts or omissions of EU 
institutions. A glimpse of the concurrent liability scenario 
between EU institutions and member states, post 
Francovich, prepares the ground for the main theoretical 
thrust of the thesis: the utilisation of Article 215(2) EC as 
the legal basis for concurrent liability.
Chapter 5 contains the intellectual justification of 
concurrent liability between EU institutions and Member 
States for damages awarded to individuals in cases of 
wrongful acts or wrongful implementation of EC law. The 
authors assume that the existing decentralised judicial 
avenues of reference procedures under Article 177 EC 
represent a major drawback to the individual, as national 
courts interpret differently the Francovich formula. This 
appears as a valid statement, since national procedural and 
substantive rules cannot provide for a uniform mechanism 
of state liability across the European Union, thus hindering 
the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectation. 
However, empirical evidence supporting the above 
assumption is missing from the debate. Are individuals 
precluded from seeking damages due to national judicial 
procedures and their unpredictable outcome? Is judicial 
centralisation the panacea in state liability cases? The 
authors seem to think that a centralised judicial route of 
concurrent liability will afford individuals better protection 
and enforceability of Community law.
Finally in Chapter 6, Stefanou and Xanthaki attempt to 
paint the political picture of the concurrent liability scenario 
and its effects upon the integration process. The value of this 
chapter rests with the angle that it focuses on the individual. 
The authors assume (correctly in my opinion) that joint 
liability of national and federal authorities places 
'government' within the European Union in a more 
accountable pedestal and provides the individual much better 
chance in holding that government accountable. However, 
there are issues that deserved a lengthier coverage.
Firstly, the design and the mechanics of the EC non- 
contractual liability regime reveal the need to protect the
EU institutions from speculative litigation and reduce the 
case-law burden for the ECJ rather than to afford 
individuals a system whereby compensation is provided for 
damages caused to them. How would a revamped Article 
215(2) EC address these issues?
Secondly, the avenue afforded to individuals for annulment 
of Community acts (Article 173 EC) follows the same pattern 
(in procedural and substantive terms) with Article 215(2) EC. 
This sort of action is a stringent, restrictive, qualified and an 
exclusive way of the individual having a direct attack at the 
law-making of EU institutions. There is certainly a correlation 
between an action for annulment and an action for damages. 
How would the concurrent liability scenario accommodate 
these independent, yet closely related, types of action before 
the ECJ?
Thirdly, national courts appear more comfortable than 
ever before in dealing with Community law. Developments 
and mechanisms such as direct effect, indirect effect and 
the Francovich formula have inserted an element of 
subsidiarity to national judiciaries. How would a 
centralised system of concurrent liability and an 
increasingly important role of the ECJ balance the role of 
national courts in applying and enforcing EC law?
Finally, Stefanou and Xanthaki have not sufficiently addressed 
the effect of the nature of European Community legal 
instruments upon the individual's access to justice. Indeed, 
directly applicable normative acts which are binding erga 
omnes (Regulations) are beyond the control of individuals, 
save for the draconian provisions stipulated in Article 173 
EC, but elevate national judiciaries as enforcementjora of the 
individual's rights. Interestingly, Directives (and their 
implementation) which feed compliance procedures 
litigation before the ECJ (Article 169 EC) aspire towards the 
same outcome via the principle of direct effectivity. In both 
legal uniformity and legal harmonisation routes, national courts 
play a central role in applying and enforcing EC law. How 
would the concurrent liability system take into account the 
existing dynamics of applying and enforcing EC law?
Despite the above comments, Stefanou and Xanthaki's 
contribution to the academic debate concerning the role of 
the individual in the European legal and political integration 
process is a valuable one. Their monograph is an original, 
well-positioned and structurally sound interdisciplinary 
thesis that deserves careful consideration equally from EU 
institutions and Member States, particularly in an era where 
accountability is in the heart of the European integration 
process. I gladly welcome C Stefanou and H Xanthaki, A 
Legal and Political Interpretation of Article 215(2) [new Article 
288(2)] of the Treaty of Rome: The individual strikes back, and 
highly recommend its reading to academics, practitioners 
and specialists in EU law and policy ©
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